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LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES IN OKLAHOMA
CHRISTEN R. BLAIR*
Introduction
The lesser included offense doctrine in criminal law generally allows the
trier of fact to convict a defendant of an offense that is less serious than
the offense with which he was charged in the accusatory pleading.' While
the doctrine originally developed as an aid to the prosecution when there was
insufficient evidence to convict on the charged offense,2 today it is more often
used by defendants seeking a conviction for an offense less serious than that
actually charged.3 Regardless of who invokes the doctrine in a criminal trial,
however, its application has caused considerable confusion among courts and
commentators alike.4 Commentators have called it a "Gordian Knot" 5 and
a "many-headed hydra." ' 6 The Florida Supreme Court has stated: "The doc-
trine [of lesser included offense] is one which has challenged the effective
administration of criminal justice for centuries," 7 while the District of Col-
umbia Circuit Court of Appeals has said that the doctrine "[is] not without
difficulty in any area of the criminal law." 8 The primary cause of this confu-
sion is the existence of several different definitions of a lesser included offense,
sometimes even within the same jurisdiction.9 Oklahoma is one of those
jurisdictions.
* J.D., 1976, Ohio State University; LL.M., 1982, Columbia University. Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.-Ed.
1. 4 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1888 (12th ed. 1957);
Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Iowa: The Gordian Knot Untied, 59 IowA
L. REV. 684 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Iowa Doctrine].
2. United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 1972); Fuller v. United States, 407
F.2d 1199, 1230 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969); Kelly v. United States,
370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967); Barnett, The Lesser-
Included Offense Doctrine: A Present Day Analysis For Practitioners, 5 CONN. L. REV. 255 (1972).
3. Barnett, supra note 2, at 255-56. See also United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 1971); People v. Mussenden,
308 N.Y. 558, 562, 127 N.E.2d 551, 553 (1955).
4. See, e.g., Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean
Task for the Michigan Courts, 1975 DET. C.L. REv. 41, 41-42; Barnett, supra note 2, at 256.
5. Comment, Iowa Doctrine, supra note 1.
6. Koenig, supra note 4.
7. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1968).
8. Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1120 (1969).
9. Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Uncertainty in the
Courts, 84 DICK. L. REV. 125, 134 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pennsylvania Doc-
trine]. Pennsylvania courts apparently employ the strict statutory theory in which the greater
offense must "necessarily involve" the lesser. Id. They have, however, upon occasion departed
from this theory and applied the "evidence approach," Commonwealth v. Nace, 222 Pa. Super.
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This article will first set forth the various definitional approaches to the
lesser included offense doctrine. The following sections will then discuss the
definitional approaches used in Oklahoma, followed by a suggestion of the
lesser included offense theory that Oklahoma should utilize. The final section
will discuss some procedural aspects of the lesser included offense doctrine.
I. The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine
The major cause of the confusion surrounding the concept of lesser in-
cluded offenses is that at least four different approaches to the problem have
been adopted by various jurisdictions in the United States.'" This problem
is exacerbated in those jurisdictions that apply more than one approach, a
situation made possible by the overlapping nature of the definitions."
Strict Statutory Interpretation
Under the common law theory, better known as the strict statutory approach,
all of the elements of the lesser included offense must be contained in the
greater offense so that it would be impossible to commit the greater offense
without first having committed the lesser.' 2 Theoretically, the strict statutory
approach is the easiest of the different approaches to apply because its ap-
plication involves merely comparing the elements of the individual offenses
in the abstract. Difficulties in statutory interpretation can arise, however, that
make application of the rule less than certain in many cases.'
3
The major problem with the strict statutory interpretation approach is its
inherent inflexibility. For example, in State v. Zdiarstek," the Wisconsin defen-
dant was charged with and convicted of battery upon a peace officer after
the defendant had injured a jailor while confined in the county jail.I At trial
the defendant requested that the jury be instructed that it could convict on
the lesser included offense of resisting or obstructing an officer.' 6 The court
refused to so instruct the jury because the offense of resisting or obstructing
an officer had as a requirement that the defendant knew or believed that he
329, 295 A.2d 87 (1972), and the "pleadings theory," Commonwealth v. Stots, 227 Pa. Super.
279, 324 A.2d 480 (1974). See Comment, supra, at 134-35.
10. Much of the background material on the lesser included offense doctrine is taken from
Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 445 (1984) and sources cited therein.
11. See Comment, Pennsylvania Doctrine, supra note 9, at 127.
12. People v. Rosario, 625 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir. 1979); Theriault v. United States, 434
F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1970); Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.
1969); Giles v. United States, 144 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1944); Koenig, supra note 4, at 44;
Comment, Pennsylvania Doctrine, supra note 9, at 129.
13. Comment, Pennsylvania Doctrine, supra note 9, at 129.
14. 53 Wis. 2d 776, 193 N.W.2d 833 (1972).
15. For the elements needed to sustain a conviction for battery to a peace officer, see id.
at 785-86, 193 N.W.2d at 838. See also Wis. STAT. § 940.205 (1982).
16. State v. Zdiarstek, 53 Wis. 2d 776, 778, 193 N.W.2d 833, 834 (1972). For the elements
of resisting or obstructing a police officer, see Wis. STAT. § 946.41 (1982).
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was resisting or obstructing an officer, acting in his official capacity at the
time of defendant's arrest, while the offense of battery on a peace officer
did not contain that element.' 7 Thus, resisting or obstructing an officer was
not a lesser included offense of battery upon a peace officer under the strict
statutory interpretation approach. The latter offense did not include every
element of the former offense, even though the facts of the case clearly showed
that the defendant knew the jailor was an officer acting in his official capacity.
The strict statutory approach is therefore concerned not with the facts of the
case but only with the elements of the offenses.
Iowa met with equally inflexible results before it abandoned the strict
statutory approach.' 8 For example, in State v. Everett,"' the Iowa Supreme
Court held that the offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's
consent was not a lesser included offense of larceny of a motor vehicle.20
Because larceny of a motor vehicle could occur without anyone operating it,
by being towed away, for example, the greater offense of larceny could not
be said to contain all the elements of the lesser offense of operating a motor
vehicle without the owner's consent.2' The test for lesser included offenses
under the strict statutory approach is therefore whether, under all possible
circumstances, the commission of the greater crime will also entail the com-
mission of the lesser offense, regardless of whether any of these circumstances
actually occurred in the case at bar.
22
Cognate Theory
The rigid results mandated by the strict statutory interpretation theory con-
flict with a principal function of the lesser included offense doctrine, which
is to "[e]nable the jury to correlate more closely the criminal conviction with
the act committed. ' 23 As a result, a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States have developed a more liberal approach to lesser included offenses
known as the cognate theory. 2' In determining whether a lesser included offense
exists under the cognate theory, the court looks not only to the elements of
the offenses but also to either the facts alleged in the accusatory pleading
or to the facts actually proved at trial.
25
17. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (setting forth elements of offenses).
18. In 1973 the Iowa Supreme Court abandoned the strict statutory approach in State v.
Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973), for an evidence approach stating, "[tihe evidence of
the case must be considered in determining whether one offense is includable within another."
ld. at 557.
19. 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968).
20. Id. at 149.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Note, Criminal Procedure-Recognizing the Jury's Province to Consider the Lesser Included
Offense: State v. Ogden, 58 OR. L. REv. 572, 577 (1980).
24. The cognate theory has been designated the majority view in Barnett, supra note 2, at
291, and in Koenig, supra note 4, at 43.
25. See Koenig, supra note 4, at 43. See also Spencer v. State, 501 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tenn.
1985]
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Cognate-Pleading Theory
There are two approaches followed in applying the cognate theory. Under
the pleadings approach, the court looks to the facts alleged in the accusatory
pleading, rather than merely to the statutory elements of the offense, to deter-
mine whether there exists a lesser included offense of the greater charged
offense. The Connecticut Supreme Court has described the cognate-pleading
approach: "The lesser offense must not require any element which is not
needed to commit the greater offense in the manner alleged in the informa-
tion or bill of particulars." ' 26 For example, if an indictment for grand larceny
of an automobile alleged that the automobile had been driven away, operating
a motor vehicle without the owner's consent would be considered a lesser
included offense of grand larceny," even though it would not be so considered
under the strict statutory approach.2"
Another example of the cognate-pleading approach is Commonwealth v.
Stots,29 in which the defendant was indicted for "attempt with intent to kill"
by means of a firearm. He was subsequently convicted of "willfully and
wantonly pointing a pistol." The defendant objected that such an offense
was not a lesser included offense of that charged in the indictment because
that offense could be committed by means other than a pistol. Under the
strict statutory approach, the defendant would have been correct. However,
under the cognate-pleading approach, since the method of commission of the
"attempt with intent to kill" was alleged in the indictment to be a pistol,
"willfully and wantonly pointing a pistol" was a lesser included offense.
Cognate-Evidence Theory
Because the prosecution can, to some extent, control the language of the
accusatory pleading, some jurisdictions have adopted a second approach to
the cognate theory. This approach focuses on the evidence supporting the
charge. Under the cognate-evidence theory, the court looks at the evidence
actually adduced in the case, rather than just to the statutory elements or
the language of the accusatory pleading, to determine the existence of any
lesser included offenses. 30 Consequently, under the cognate-evidence approach,
if an indictment for grand larceny of an automobile failed to allege how the
1973) (joyriding lesser included offense of grand larceny since information showed that property
taken was automobile driven away).
26. State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 62, 301 A.2d 547, 553 (1972).
27. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973); Commonwealth v. Nace, 222 Pa. Super.
329, 295 A.2d 87 (1972); Koenig, supra note 4, at 43. Whether the court actually instructed
the jury on the lesser included offense would still depend upon the evidence adduced at trial
because most jurisdictions require that there be a rational basis in the evidence justifying the
instruction. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982); Comment, Pennsylvania Doctrine, supra
note 9, at 132; Comment, Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
61, 62, 65 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Jury Instructions].
28. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text explaining the strict statutory approach.
29. 227 Pa. Super. 279, 324 A.2d 480 (1974).
30. See Koenig, supra note 4, at 44.
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automobile'was stolen, but the evidence at the trial showed it to have been
driven away, the offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's
consent would be considered a lesser included offense of grand larceny.
Though the strict statutory interpretation theory has been criticized for being
too inflexible, the cognate theory has been criticized as being too flexible.3"
Because the existence of the lesser included offense depends upon the facts
that will be proved during the trial, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the
bounds of the cognate theory. Thus its application becomes more difficult
than the more mechanical strict statutory approach. It has been argued that
the cognate-evidence approach may put the defendant at an unfair disadvan-
tage. The defendant will either have to prepare to defend against all the possible
lesser included offenses, or else take the risk of only preparing to defend against
the charged offense.32 This disadvantage, however, is not unique to the defen-
dant. In such cases the prosecution must also be prepared for all the possible
lesser included offenses, in the event the defense seeks to have the jury charged
on one or more of them.
Model Penal Code Approach
Section 1.07(4)(c) of the Model Penal Code has adopted a novel and broad
test for determining when a lesser included offense exists.33 Under the Code,
an offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense when: "(c) it
differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury
or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser
kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission. ' 3
31. Id. at 45; Comment, Jury Instructions, supra note 27, at 63.
32. Comment, Jury Instructions, supra note 27, at 63. Another problem raised by the possibility
of numerous lesser included offenses is the adequacy of the notice of the offenses to the defen-
dant, which is discussed infra notes 104-116 and accompanying text. See also State v. Hooks,
69 Wis. 182, 33 N.W. 57 (1887) (state cannot compel defendant to contest any issue the state
is not bound to prove in order to convict him of offense charged).
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4), 10 U.L.A. 456-57 (1974) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
provides:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in
the indictment [or the information]. An offense is so included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or
to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious in-
jury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser
kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
Paragraph (a) corresponds to either the strict statutory or cognate theory, depending on whether
it is concerned with the facts actually proved or in the abstract. Paragraph (b) includes attempt
and solicitation as lesser included offenses, although they traditionally have not been so con-
sidered because they are not elements contained within the greater offense. See Comment, Penn-
sylvania Doctrine, supra note 9, at 130.
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(c), 10 U.L.A. 457 (1974) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
19851
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Although neither courts nor legislatures have widely adopted this theory,"
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has praised this general
approach for providing a "more natural, realistic and sound interpretation
of the scope of 'lesser included offense'."' 6 Utilizing this approach, the court
held that an offense can be a lesser included offense when it is established
by the evidence adduced at trial in proof of the greater offense, regardless
of the legal elements of the two offenses or the language of the accusatory
pleading. 3" The only limitation the court imposed is
[t]hat there must also be an "inherent" relationship between the
greater and lesser offenses, i.e., they must relate to the protection
of the same interests and must be so related that in the general
nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof
of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing
of the commission of the greater offense.
3
1
Since this theory is even broader than the cognate theory, the flexibility
objection is greater. Because the elements of the offenses need not be the
same, but need only have an "inherent" relationship, the possible range of
lesser included offenses is even greater under this theory than under the cognate
theory.
II. Lesser Included Offense Tests Applied in Oklahoma
Oklahoma has codified the lesser included offense doctrine in section 916
of title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1981), which provides: "The jury may
find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily
included in that with which he is charged, or of an attempt to commit the
offense."
Whether any particular offense is "necessarily included" depends upon the
lesser included offense test applied. As indicated above, an offense may be
a lesser included offense of a greater charged offense under one test but not
under another.3 Thus the effective application of the lesser included offense
doctrine turns, in the first instance, on the test used to define a lesser in-
35. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-9 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-8d (West 1982), for two states
that have adopted the Model Penal Code language.
36. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also United States
v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983) (adopting the "in-
herent relationship" test in a case on appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma).
37. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38. Id.
39. For example, joyriding would be a lesser included offense of larceny of an automobile
under the cognate-evidence test if the evidence indicated that the automobile had been driven
away. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. Under the cognate-pleading test, it would be
a lesser included offense if the accusatory pleading alleged that the automobile had been driven
away. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. It would not be a lesser included offense under
the strict statutory interpretation test. See supra text accompanying notes 12-22.
[Vol. 38:697
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cluded offense. Although more recent cases seem to employ the cognate-
evidence test, Oklahoma has, at one time or another, purported to utilize
all of the tests except the Model Penal Code approach."'
Strict Statutory Interpretation
Cochran v. State appears to be the first case in which the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals applied what was, in effect, the strict statutory inter-
pretation approach to lesser included offenses."' In that case the court had
to determine whether the offense of riot was necessarily included in the offense
of robbery. In deciding that it was not, the court noted that although the
crime of riot required the use of force or violence, that was only one of the
possible ways in which a robbery could be committed.42 The court obviously
was not concerned with how the robbery was actually committed, but rather
only with whether it could possibly be committed in some way that would
not also result in the commission of riot. This hypothetical approach to the
elements of the offenses distinguishes the strict statutory interpretation test.
In Thoreson v. State,13 the court relied upon the Cochran rationale in
applying the strict statutory interpretation test in deciding that assault was
not a lesser included offense of robbery. Since assault could only be commit-
ted with force or violence, but robbery could, in addition, be committed by
fear, assault was not a necessarily included offense. 4 A more recent case in
which the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the strict statutory interpreta-
tion test is Harris v. State.15 Here the court concluded that burglary in the
second degree was not a lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree.1
6
In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned in classic strict statutory inter-
pretation fashion "that there are instances where the crime of burglary in
40. Oklahoma has, of course, not adopted the Model Penal Code.
41. 4 Okla. Crim. 379, 111 P. 974 (1910).
42. Id. at 382, 111 P. at 975. "Robbery" was defined as the wrongful taking of personal
property in the possession of another from his person or immediate presence and against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear. Snyder's Comp. Laws Okla. § 2309 (1909). "Riot"
was defined as "[a]ny use of force or violence, or any threats to use force or violence if accom-
panied by immediate power of execution, by three or more persons acting tbgether and without
authority of law." Snyder's Comp. Laws Okla. § 2497 (1909). The defendant was charged along
with three codefendants.
43. 69 Okla. Crim. 128, 100 P.2d 896 (1940).
44. "Assault is defined as any willful and unlawful attempt or offer, with force or violence,
to do a corporal hurt to another. Section 1865, O.S. 1931, 21 Oki. St. Ann. § 641." Id. at
138, 100 P.2d at 901. "Section 2542, O.S. 1931, 21 Oki. St. Ann. § 791 defines robbery as
follows: Robbery is a wrongful taking of personal property in the possession of another, from
his person or immediate presence, and against his will by means of force or fear." Id. at 137,
100 P.2d at 901.
45. 291 P.2d 372 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
46. Burglary in the first degree was defined:
Every person who breaks into and enters in the nighttime the dwelling house
of another, in which there is at the time some human being, with intent to commit
some crime therein, either:
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
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the first degree could be committed under circumstances which would not
also include the elements of burglary in the second degree." 4 Although the
court discussed the strict statutory approach, the decision was also based on
the premise that there was no basis in the evidence to justify an instruction
on burglary in the second degree." Since this lack of evidence would also
prevent a lesser included offense instruction under the cognate theory, Harris
is not a pure example of the strict statutory interpretation approach to lesser
included offenses.
Cognate-Pleading Test
Smith v. State is a good example of the application of the cognate-pleading
test."' Smith was charged with murder based on procurement of an illegal
abortion,5" but was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.' Since
one element of the murder involved the commission of a felony, while one
element of the manslaughter required the commission of a misdemeanor,
manslaughter would not have been a lesser included offense under the strict
statutory interpretation test because it might be possible to commit the murder
without also committing the manslaughter. The Smith court, however, held
that the manslaughter charge was a lesser included offense of the charged
murder.
The court reached this conclusion by looking to the factual allegations in
the accusatory pleading. Although the information only charged murder, it
alleged facts indicating that the defendant had committed a misdemeanor
because she was not a "licensed medical doctor" and she did not have legal
authority to practice medicine.5 2 Thus, because the information alleged facts
indicating the commission of a misdemeanor, manslaughter in the first degree
was, under those circumstances, a lesser included offense of murder.
1. By forcibly bursting or breaking the wall, or an outer door, window, or shutter
of a window of such house or the lock or bolts of such door, or the fastening
of such windows or shutter....
21 OKLA. STAT. § 1431 (1951). (21 OKLA STAT. § 1431 (1981) is identical).
Burglary in the second degree was defined: "Every person who breaks and enters any building
or any part of any building, room, booth, tent, railroad car, automobile, truck, trailer, vessel
or other structure or erection in which any property is kept, with intent to steal therein or to
commit any felony." 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1435 (1951).
47. 291 P.2d 347, 374 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955). By way of example, the court pointed out
that if a person broke into and entered during the night the dwelling house of another, in which
there was a human being, with the intent to commit some misdemeanor other than petit larceny,
he would be guilty of first degree burglary but not second degree burglary.
48. See infra notes 117-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of the necessity of an
evidentiary basis for a lesser included offense instruction.
49. 83 Okla. Crim. 209, 175 P.2d 348 (1946).
50. Under 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701 (1941), homicide was murder: "3. When perpetrated without
any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony."
51. Under 21 OKLA. STAT. § 711 (1941), homicide was manslaughter in the first degree:
"1. When perpetrated without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commis-
sion of a misdemeanor." (21 OKLA. STAT. § ,711(f) (1981) is identical).
52. 59 OKLA. STAT. § 491 (1941) (59 OKLA. STAT. § 491 (1981) is identical).
[Vol. 38:697
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A number of other Oklahoma cases discuss the importance of looking at
the factual allegations in the accusatory pleading in determining whether an
offense is a lesser included one of that charged. 3 Those cases, however, also
seem to turn on the question of the sufficiency of the indictment or informa-
tion to support a conviction of the lesser offense. Under Oklahoma law, if
the pleading does not adequately apprise the defendant of the facts constituting
the commission of a lesser offense, the pleading is insufficient to charge and
support a conviction of that offense.5 4 Thus the cognate-pleading test will
support a lesser included offense charge when proper facts are alleged. If they
are not, it is usually the law with respect to the sufficiency of the pleading
that denies the lesser included offense charge."
Cognate-Evidence Test
The cognate-evidence test is only needed to support a lesser included offense
instruction in the relatively rare situation in which the facts adduced at trial
indicate the commission of a lesser offense, but those facts have not been
alleged in the accusatory pleading. If the facts are properly alleged, the cognate-
pleading test would support the instruction. If the facts are not properly alleged,
the accusatory pleading would be insufficient to support the instruction, at
least in instances in which the prosecution is requesting the instruction. 6
Although the cognate-evidence test is thus at least partially inconsistent with
the law concerning the sufficiency of accusatory pleadings, a recent case from
the Court of Criminal Appeals has, in effect, cited that test with approval.
In Wilson v. State,"1 the court concluded that carrying a concealed weapon"
was not a lesser included offense of carrying a firearm into an establishment
where beer and intoxicating liquor are consumed. 9 In reaching this conclu-
53. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 603 P.2d 1157 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Stokes v. State, 86
Okla. Crim. 21, 189 P.2d 424 (1948), modified, 190 P.2d 678; Kelly v. State, 12 Okla. Crim.
208, 153 P. 1094 (1916).
54. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 603 P.2d 1157 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Stokes v. State, 86
Okla. Crim. 21, 189 P.2d 424 (1948), modified, 190 P.2d 678; Kelly v. State, 12 Okla. Crim.
208, 153 P. 1094 (1916).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 104-115 for the proposition that such lack of notice
should only prevent the state, not the defendant, from seeking a lesser included offense instruction.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
57. 649 P.2d 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
58. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1289.8 (1981), which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
except a law enforcement officer, a registered security officer or a person employed by an armored
car firm licensed by the Corporation Commission, to carry a concealed weapon other than per-
mitted by this act."
59. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1272.1 (1981), which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, as defined in Section
99 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, when in the county or counties of his
employment or residence, or the owner or proprietor of the establishment being
entered, to carry into or to possess in any establishment where beer or alcoholic
beverages are consumed any of the weapons designated in Section 1272, Title 21
of the Oklahoma Statutes.
19851
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sion the court held that the test is whether each offense requires proof of
some fact or element that the other does not require to sustain a conviction."0
This is the same test that was adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Blockburger v. United States" for use in determining whether two offenses
are the "same offense" under the double jeopardy clause.6" The Blockburger
test for the "same offense" seems to parallel the strict statutory interpreta-
tion approach to lesser included offenses' by emphasizing the elements of
the offenses rather than the facts either alleged or proved; however, several
Supreme Court cases have applied the Blockburger "same offense" test in
a way that is essentially the equivalent of the cognate-evidence approach to
lesser included offenses." Therefore, by adopting the Blockburger "same
offense" test in Wilson, the Court of Criminal Appeals seems to have im-
plicitly adopted the cognate-evidence approach to lesser included offenses.
Another indication that the Court of Criminal Appeals has utilized the
cognate-evidence test is the innumerable cases in which the court has held
that a lesser included offense instruction should be given only when warranted
by the evidence in the case." Although most of those cases involve the
application of a separate procedural requirement," they also indicate a need
to look to the evidence, and not just the statutory elements or the accusatory
pleading, in order to adequately apply the lesser included offense doctrine.
III. Oklahoma Should Apply the Cognate Theory
As the preceding discussion shows, Oklahoma has not always been consis-
tent in the application of the lesser included offense doctrine. Earlier cases
seemed to prefer the strict statutory interpretation approach, 67 with later cases
opting for the cognate-pleading test, 68 with some occasional indication of the
cognate-evidence test.' To be consistent, the Court of Criminal Appeals should
make it clear which lesser included offense theory should be utilized. This
clarification must be made consistent with the constitutional limitations on
the lesser included offense doctrine. Such limitations appear to dictate that
the cognate theory be utilized,70 with the pleadings approach being applied
60. 649 P.2d at 786, citing to 22 OKLA. STAT. § 916, (1981), Oklahoma's necessarily included
offense statute.
61. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
62. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, provides in part: "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
63. See supra text accompanying notes 12-22 (discussing strict statutory interpretation approach
to lesser included offenses).
64. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (discussing the cognate-evidence approach to
lesser included offenses).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 116-129.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 56-66.
70. Much of the information for this section is from Blair, supra note 10, and sources cited
therein.
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to prosecution requests for a lesser included offense instruction and the evidence
approach applied to at least some defendant requests.
Double Jeopardy
The primary reason for this proposal is the double jeopardy clause.7" If
an offense is a lesser included one of the offense charged, a conviction or
acquittal of the charged crime would bar a subsequent prosecution of the
lesser offense. 2 Conversely, a conviction or acquittal of the lesser included
offense would bar a subsequent prosecution of the greater offense. 73 Thus,
a greater and lesser included offense are the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes. 74 However, since different lesser included offense theories
yield different results, it remains to be determined which one is the equivalent
of the double jeopardy "same offense" test.
In the landmark case of Blockburger v. United States,75 the Supreme Court
fashioned the following rule for determining when two offenses were the "same
offense" under the double jeopardy clause: "where the same act or trans-
action constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." '7 6 As dis-
cussed above, although this "same offense" test might initially seem to parallel
the strict statutory interpretation theory of lesser included offense, several
recent Supreme Court cases have applied the "same offense" test in a way
that is the functional equivalent of the cognate-evidence theory of lesser in-
cluded offenses. In Brown v. Ohio,77 the Court held that the double jeopardy
clause barred prosecution and punishment for the offense of auto theft follow-
ing prosecution and punishment for the lesser included offense of operating
the same vehicle without the owner's consent. As discussed previously, the
offense of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent has not been con-
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V, quoted supra at note 62.
72. In re Neilsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889).
73. Id. at 188. The Court endorsed the rule that "[wihere ... a person has been tried and
convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time
tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id.
In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), the Court stated that: "The [Neilsen] opinion makes
it clear that the sequence is immaterial." Id. at 168. The Court went on to hold that "[w]hatever
the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punish-
ment for a greater and lesser included offense." Id. at 169. The Brown opinion did leave open
the possibility of an exception to this rule "[wlhere the State is unable to proceed on the more
serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have
not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." Id. at 169 n.7
(citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453
n.7 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). See also Hall v. State, 650 P.2d 893 (Okla. Crim. App.
1982) (sequence of cases is immaterial to double jeopardy claim).
74. U.S. CorST. amend. V.
75. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
76. Id. at 304.
77. 432 U.S. 161 (1971).
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sidered a lesser included offense of the crime of auto theft or grand larceny
in jurisdictions that adhere to the strict statutory approach. 78 Under the
cognate-evidence test, however, if the evidence adduced at trial indicated that
the car had been driven away, the offense of operating the same vehicle without
the owner's consent would be a lesser included offense of the greater offense
of auto theft. 79 Moreover, it would also be the "same offense" under the
Blockburger test as applied in Brown.
Missouri v. Hunter also implicitly supports the similarity between the
cognate-evidence test and the "same offense" test for double jeopardy.80 In
Hunter the defendant was convicted in a single trial of robbery, under a statute
that required that the perpetrator put the victim "[i]n fear of some immediate
injury to his person,"'" and of armed criminal action, under a statute that
punished an underlying felony, in this case, robbery, committed "[w]ith, or
through the assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon."' 82 Because
it would be possible to commit the offense of robbery by putting the victim
in fear of immediate injury by some method other than through use of a
dangerous or deadly weapon, 83 armed criminal action could not be a lesser
included offense of robbery under the strict statutory interpretation theory.
Under the cognate-evidence theory, however, because the robbery was proved
at trial to have actually been committed with a deadly weapon, armed criminal
action would be a lesser included offense of robbery. The Supreme Court
agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court"' that the two offenses were also
the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes."
Thus, although the Blockburger test for determining the "same offense"
is phrased in terms of the elements of the offenses, Supreme Court applica-
tion of the test emphasizes the facts or evidence adduced at trial in support
of the elements, rather than merely the elements themselves, when determin-
ing whether offenses are the "same offense." Likewise, the cognate-evidence
theory emphasizes the evidence adduced at trial in determining whether one
offense is a lesser included offense of a greater offense.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
79. See supra text accompanying note 30.
80. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.120 (1969).
82. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.225 (Supp. 1976).
83. One could merely threaten the victim with his fists or an object not considered to be
a deadly weapon.
84. State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. 1981).
85. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Additional authority in support of the proposi-
tion that the "same offense" test is the equivalent of the cognate-evidence theory may be found
in Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982), in which the Court emphasized the importance of
the evidence adduced at trial in determining whether due process requires that a lesser included
offense instruction be given. Thus, the facts or evidence used to prove the elements of the offense,
rather than the elements themselves, are of importance to the Supreme Court when determining
what are "same offenses" and lesser included offenses. For more on the import of Hopper v.
Evans and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), in which the Court first applied due process
to the requirement of a lesser included offense instruction, see Blair, supra note 10, at 462-75.
See also infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
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Although a test that can be applied in the same manner as the double
jeopardy test seemingly would provide greater efficiency, this does not mean
that the double jeopardy clause requires Oklahoma to adopt the cognate-
evidence theory of lesser included offenses. Oklahoma could still use the strict
statutory interpretation theory. The use of that theory, however, does entail
the risk that double jeopardy will bar a subsequent prosecution for an of-
fense for which the strict statutory interpretation approach had previously
barred consideration by the jury. For example, as discussed above, joyriding
is not considered a lesser included offense of grand larceny of an automobile
under the strict statutory interpretation theory. 86 It is, however, a lesser in-
cluded offense under the cognate-evidence test 7 (and also under the cognate-
pleading test if the appropriate facts are alleged)."8 Since it is also the "same
offense" as the larceny under the double jeopardy clause, an acquittal on
the larceny charge would bar a subsequent prosecution for joyriding.89 If the
basis for the acquittal was that the jury thought the defendant was only
joyriding, not stealing, the strict statutory interpretation theory, along with
the double jeopardy clause, would prevent a conviction for the crime actually
committed by the defendant. Under the cognate-evidence theory, of course,
the jury could have considered the lesser offense of joyriding and convicted
the defendant of that crime at the same trial without running afoul of the
double jeopardy clause.
Although the double jeopardy clause does not require Oklahoma to adopt
the cognate-evidence theory, in some circumstances, due process may provide
a strong constitutional limitation.
Due Process-Reliability of the Guilt Determination
In Beck v. Alabama,9° the defendant was charged with "[riobbery or
attempts thereof when the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant." 9'
Felony murder was a lesser included offense of the capital offense of robbery-
intentional killing. 92 There was sufficient evidence to support a lesser included
offense instruction. 3 The Alabama capital offense statute, however, prevented
the jury from considering any lesser included offenses.94 Instead, the jury was
86. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
87. See supra text accompanying note 30.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
89. See supra text accompanying note 77.
90. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
91. Id. at 627 n.I (quoting ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a)(2) (1975)).
92. This is because, under the Alabama death penalty statute, the requisite intent to kill could
not be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine. Id. at 628 n.2 (quoting ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(b)
(1975)).
93. According to Beck's version of the facts, he and an accomplice entered the victim's home
in the afternoon, and after he had seized the man, intending to bind him with a rope, his accomplice
unexpectedly struck and killed the man. Beck consistently denied that he killed the man or that
he intended his death. Id. at 629-30.
94. ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a) (1975). This statute was invalidated in Beck, 447 U.S. 625, 638
(1980).
1985]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
given the choice of either convicting Beck of a capital crime and imposing
the death penalty, or acquitting him and allowing him to escape all penalties
for his alleged participation in the crime.9/
The Supreme Court reversed Beck's conviction and death sentences,
specifically holding that the death penalty may not be imposed constitutionally
after a jury verdict of guilty of a capital offense when the jury was not per-
mitted to consider a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense.96 The Court
relied on a reservation expressed in Keeble v. United States,97 i.e., when a
lesser included offense instruction is not given and "the defendant is plainly
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction." 9 Because such a possibility diminished "the reliability of the
guilt determination" 99 and enhanced "the risk of an unwarranted convic-
tion,"' 0 0 the Court held that Alabama was constitutionally prohibited from
withdrawing the lesser included offense option from the jury in a capital case.' 0 '
Although the Supreme Court carefully confined its holding in Beck to tapital
cases and specifically stated that it "need not and [does] not decide whether
the Due Process Clause would require the giving of such instruction in a non-
capital case,"'' 12 it would seem that the failure to give such an instruction
in a noncapital case would affect the "reliability of the guilt determination"
just as much as in a capital case. If so, then due process would dictate that
Oklahoma utilize the cognate-evidence theory with respect to defense requests
for lesser included offense instructions in cases in which there is a "risk of
an unwarranted conviction" if the jurors are not allowed to consider any lesser
included offenses.' 3 For example, in the joyriding-larceny example, if the
95. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 628-29 n.3 (quoting ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a) (1975), pro-
viding: "If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it shall fix the punishment at death when the
defendant is charged by indictment with any of the following offenses and with aggravation,
which must also be averred in the indictment, and which offenses so charged with said aggrava-
tion shall not include any lesser offenses"). The jury was specifically instructed that if Beck
was acquitted of the capital crime of intentional killing in the course of a robbery, "he can
never be tried for anything that he did to [the victim]." Id. at 630.
96. Id. at 638.
97. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). In Keeble the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to
commit serious bodily injury after the court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of simple assault. Id. at 205-06.
98. 447 U.S. at 634 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. at 212-13). The complete
text of the quote from Keeble is: "A defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction-in
this context or any other-precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk
that the jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve
its doubts in favor of conviction .... We cannot say that the availability of a third option-
convicting the defendant of [a lesser offense]-could not have resulted in a different verdict.
412 U.S. at 212-13.
99. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 638 n.14.
103. See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the cognate-evidence
theory should generally be limited to defense requests for a lesser included offense instruction.
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evidence clearly indicated that the defendant took the car but did not intend
to steal it, it might be necessary to give an instruction on the joyriding charge.
Thus the jury would be prevented from convicting the defendant on the larceny
charge, not because he committed larceny but because he committed some
offense and he should not go completely free.
Due Process-Notice
The primary reason for suggesting that the cognate-pleading test be utilized
when the prosecution requests a lesser included offense instruction is the due
process requirement of notice.'0I The lesser included offense doctrine, by defini-
tion, raises a due process notice problem because no matter which particular
theory of the doctrine is applied, the defendant must prepare a defense against
a charge for which he has not specifically been given notice. However, the
lesser included offense doctrine itself, through the accusatory pleading of the
state, can provide sufficient notice to the defendant. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[tihe indictment is, for legal pur-
poses, sufficient notice to the defendant that he may be called to defend the
lesser included charge."'0 5 Similarly, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has stated: "It is axiomatic that an indict-
ment for one crime carries with it notice that lesser offenses included within
the specified crime are also charged and must be defended against."'1
0 6
Oklahoma certainly puts a defendant on notice that he might have to defend
against some lesser included offense,'10 but due process requires more specifici-
ty.' 0 The cognate-pleading theory, by relying on the factual allegations of
the accusatory pleading, can provide that notice. The cognate-evidence theory
might not.
Turning to the joyriding-larceny example once again,' 9 if the accusatory
pleading alleges that the method of larceny was by driving the car away, the
accusatory pleading in conjunction with section 916 of title 22 of the Oklahoma
Statutes provides adequate notice that the defendant might also have to defend
104. The sixth amendment states that "[in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (right to reasonable notice of charges basic
to our system of jurisprudence); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (notice is an essen-
tial element of due process); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1897) (same). Because this
right of notice is basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, it is part of the "due process
of law" that is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to defendants in the criminal courts
of the states. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
105. Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
106. Mildwoff v. Cunningham, 432 F. Supp. 814, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
107. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 916 (1981), which provides: "The jury may find the defendant
guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that which he is charged,
or of an attempt to commit the offense."
108. See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 768 (1962) (indictment must set forth
specific offense with which defendant charged); United States v. Milk Distributors Ass'n, 200
F. Supp. 792, 802 (D. Md. 1961) (same).
109. See supra notes 20-21, 27-28, 30-31, & 103 and accompanying text.
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against the lesser included offense of joyriding."' On the other hand, if the
accusatory pleading fails to allege the method of the larceny, but the evidence
shows the car to have been driven away, it is questionable whether the defen-
dant has received adequate notice of the joyriding charge. Although the defen-
dant may have a right to a lesser included offense instruction under these
circumstances,I' the prosecutor may not because of the lack of notice.
This option of using one lesser included offense test for prosecution re-
quests and another for defense requests has been adopted by Florida in Ander-
son v. State."2 In Anderson, the Florida Supreme Court held that where the
existence of a lesser included offense is determined by the language of the
accusatory pleading, the prosecution is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction only if that offense was sufficiently included in the accusatory
pleading to satisfy the due process notice requirement.' 3 However, the court
held that because the prosecution's accusation constitutes only an ex parte
claim, the defendant is entitled to such an instruction on any offense within
the "general scope" of the crime charged and of which there is sufficient
evidence.' ' This is possible because even though there may have been insuffi-
cient notice, notice is the defendant's constitutional right, not the prosecutor's,
and the defendant is generally free to waive his constitutional rights.'"
IV. Procedural Aspects of the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine
Instruction Must Be Warranted By the Evidence
Even after it has been determined what offenses might be lesser included
offenses of the greater charged offense, a lesser included offense instruction
is not rendered automatically. Many Oklahoma cases have held that the in-
struction should be given only where, under the evidence in the case, it would
be reasonable for the jury to find that the defendant did not commit the greater
110. See supra note 107.
111. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text (discussion of due process right to lesser
included offense instruction when the "reliability of the guilt determination" would be otherwise
affected).
112. 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1971). One obstacle to this dual approach is the doctrine of mutuality,
which essentially requires that both parties have the identical right to request a lesser included
offense instruction. The right of the prosecutor to a lesser included offense instruction is "limited
to the offense of which defendant has been given notice by the indictment," Kelly v. United
States, 370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967). Under the doctrine
of mutuality, the defendant should be subject to this same notice requirement. United States
v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The test for mutuality, the Whitaker court
said, is "whether the prosecutor could have rightly requested the lesser included offense charge;
therefore, whether the defense was entitled to it on request." Id. There do not appear to be
any Oklahoma cases adopting the mutuality doctrine. It is one premise of this article that the
doctrine of mutuality would violate due process if it were used to deny the defendant a lesser
included offense instruction in a situation in which the "reliability of the guilt determination"
would be otherwise affected. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
113. 255 So. 2d at 556.
114. Id.
115. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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offense but did commit the lesser one."' 6 Thus, where the evidence indicates
that the defendant is either guilty of the greater charged offense or nothing,
the instruction should not be given.
In Paregien v. State,I 7 the defendant was charged with operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."' At the trial three
different investigating officers testified that the defendant appeared to be in-
toxicated or highly intoxicated at the time of his arrest." 9 The defense testimony
indicated that the defendant had not drunk any alcohol on the day and even-
ing in question.' 2' Since the evidence indicated that the defendant was either
intoxicated as he operated his vehicle, or cold sober, the trial court's failure
to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of driving while impaired
was not error.' 2 '
A number of cases have indicated that when the defense is an alibi a lesser
included offense instruction is inappropriate. In Campbell v. State,'22 for
example, the defendant claimed an alibi to a charge of first degree burglary.
Because under the alibi, the evidence indicated that the defendant either was
guilty of the charged offense, or nothing, it was not error to refuse his re-
quested instruction on the lesser included offense of breaking and entering.
123
Likewise, in Seegars v. State,'24 a murder prosecution, when the defendant
testified that although he was in the room when the victim was shot, another
person had done the shooting, it was not error to refuse his requested instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree.'25
In most instances, the requirement that the lesser included offense instruc-
tion be warranted by the evidence may require the defendant to introduce
some evidence tending to prove the commission of the lesser offense. This
is not always the case, however. It is sufficient if the state's evidence indicates
116. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 703 P.2d 950 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Liles v. State, 702
P.2d 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Seegars v. State, 655 P.2d 563, 565 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983); Campbell v. State, 640 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Boling v. State, 589
P.2d 1089 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Case v. State, 555 P.2d 619, 624-25 (Okla. Crim. App.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); McKee v. State, 531 P.2d 343, 345 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975).
117. 630 P.2d 326 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
118. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902 (1971).
119. 630 P.2d at 327.
120. Id.
121. Id. Under appropriate circumstances the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that driving
while impaired, 47 OKLA. STAT. § 761 (1981), is a lesser included offense of driving under the
influence, 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902 (1981), Jackson v. State, 554 P.2d 39 (Okla. Crim. App.
1976). In Paregien, however, Judge Bussey stated that he was in error in concurring in that
conclusion in Jackson. 630 P.2d 327 n.l. In Bailey v. State, 633 P.2d 1249 (Okla. Crim. App.
1981), the court overruled Jackson and held that driving while impaired was not a lesser included
offense of driving under the influence, since the former requires proof of evidence of bad effects
on public safety while the latter does not.
122. 640 P.2d 1364 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
123. Id. at 1366.
124. 655 P.2d 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
125. Id. at 565.
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the commission of the lesser offense. In Atterberry v. State,,26 a prosecution
for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, the state introduced evidence that
the automobile owner did not give permission for her car to be moved and
that the car was found in a ditch with the defendant in it. The state did not,
however, introduce any evidence linking the defendant to the car prior to
finding it in the ditch. Therefore, it was error to refuse the defendant's re-
quested instruction on the lesser included offense of tampering with a motor
vehicle.' 27 In a similar vein is Donaldson v. State,2 ' a rape prosecution in
which the victim's testimony could have indicated that the defendant tried
to commit rape but failed. Under such evidence the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with intent to
c6mmit rape.
Defendant Has a Right to the Lesser Included Offense Instruction
Once an offense is determined to be a lesser included one and the evidence
warrants giving the instruction, the defendant has a right to have the jury
so instructed.'2 9 Nevertheless, a question remains whether that right can be
waived by failure to request the instruction, or whether the trial court should
give the instruction sua sponte.
Many Oklahoma cases have held that when the defendant is entitled to the
instruction, it is error to fail to give it even if no request has been made. 3
More recent cases, however, have held that the failure to request the instruc-
tion will act as a waiver of the right to the instruction.' 3 ' Although these
two theories are inconsistent, the Court of Criminal Appeals has made no
attempt to reconcile them. Apparently, however, the more recent trend is to
treat the lack of a request as a waiver rather than require the trial court to
instruct irrespective of a request.' 32
126. 555 P.2d 1301 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
127. Id. at 1303-04.
128. 73 Okla. Crim. 41, 117 P.2d 555 (1941).
129. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 554 P.2d 39 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); Gibson v. State, 501
P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Davis v. State, 481 P.2d 161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Tarter
v. State, 359 P.2d 596 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Harris v. State, 291 P.2d 372 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1955).
130. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 554 P.2d 39 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976), overruled on other
grounds in Bailey v. State, 633 P.2d 1249 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); Dixon v. State, 545 P.2d
1262, 1264 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) ("The evidence presented by the State requires such an
instruction whether requested or not."); Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972);
Davis v. State, 481 P.2d 161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Tarter v. State, 359 P.2d 596 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1961) ("the court should instruct the jury on the law of each degree of homicide
which the evidence tends to prove, whether it is requested on the part of the defendant or not"),
quoting Welborn v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 97, 105 P.2d 187 (1940) (same).
131. See, e.g., Eby v. State, 702 P.2d 1047 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Jeffries v. State, 679
P.2d 846 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Tedder v. State, 540 P.2d 582 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975);
Vickers v. State, 538 P.2d 1134 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
132. The most recent decision on this issue, Eby v. State, 702 P.2d 1047 (Okla. Crim. App.
1985) decided on July 5, 1985, approves of the waiver theory.
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This modern trend is probably the best approach to the problem. If a defen-
dant wants the instruction, he need only request it. On the other hand, the
waiver theory does not force him to have the instruction if, as a matter of
tactics, he does not want it. A defendant might choose to forego a lesser
included offense instruction in the hope of being acquitted altogether on the
greater charge. If the jury were allowed to consider the lesser charge, there
is always the chance that the jury could reach a compromise and convict the
defendant of that lesser charge. In order to avoid that possibility, the defen-
dant may not want to request a lesser included offense instruction. The waiver
theory allows him that option.
There does appear to be one exception to the waiver theory. In 1975, in
Morgan v. State,'33 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that in every future
prosecution for murder, whenever the evidence necessitates an instruction on
self-defense the trial court shall also instruct on voluntary or first degree
manslaughter committed in the heat of passion as a lesser included offense.
The court further held that the instruction need not be requested and should
be given regardless of an objection thereto.1 34 In this one instance, then, the
instruction is mandatory and cannot be waived by the defendant.
Lesser Included Offense Barred by Statute of Limitations
Even if the defendant makes an appropriate request for a lesser included
offense instruction that is warranted by the evidence, there is at least one
instance in which the instruction may still not be given. That is when the
lesser included offense is barred by a statute of limitations.
Although there do not appear to be any reported cases in Oklahoma on
this issue, most jurisdictions in the United States refuse to give an otherwise
valid lesser included offense instruction for an offense barred by a statute
of limitations, even when requested by the defendant.' 3 A few jurisdictions,
however, will allow the instruction but require the defendant to waive the
statute of limitations defense.
136
In a jurisdiction that allows the option of waiving the statute of limita-
tions, a defendant may wish to make the tactical decision to waive the statute
133. 536 P.2d 952 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
134. Id. at 959.
135. See, e.g., Chaifetz v. United States, 288 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 366 U.S. 209 (1961); Padie v. State, 557 P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1976); People v.
Morgan, 75 Cal. App. 3d 32, 141 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977); Holloway v. State, 362 So. 2d 333
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Chevlin, 284 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. 1955); State v. Aircraft Sup-
plies, Inc., 45 N.J. Super. 110, 131 A.2d 571 (1957); People v. Soto, 76 Misc. 2d 491, 352 N.Y.S.2d
144 (1974); Hickey y. State, 131 Tenn. 112, 174 S.W. 269 (1915); McKinney v. State, 96 Tex.
Crim. 342, 257 S.W. 258 (1923); State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943); State v.
King, 140 W. Va. 362, 84 S.E.2d 313 (1954).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1110 (1983); United States v. Akmakjean, 647 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
964 (1981); United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 422 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916
(1977); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
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and get the lesser included offense instruction in order to avoid the possibility
that the jury will convict on the greater offense because the jurors are con-
vinced the defendant did commit some offense, and conviction on the greater
offense is the only choice.' 37 The prosecutor could not force the defendant
to waive the statute.1
38
Because a major purpose of the lesser included offense doctrine is to
"[e]nable the jury to correlate more closely the criminal conviction with the
act committed,"' 3 9 the best approach would be to allow the defendant to waive
the statute of limitations, especially in those situations in which "the reli-
ability of the guilt determination" would be otherwise affected.4 0 Although
it has been argued that the defendant should be able to get the lesser included
offense instruction without having to waive the statute of limitations J4 ' the
Supreme Court has recently held in Spaziano v. State that the failure to give
the instruction in the face of a refusal to waive the statute is not a violation
of due process.41
One reason why this issue has not appeared in any reported Oklahoma cases
is because of the limited number of fact situations in which it could arise.
There is no limitation on prosecutions for murder.' 3 The prosecution of all
other offenses, with the exception of some specialized offenses involving
governmental assets and some crimes against children, must be commenced
within three years.' 44 Thus the only likely situation in which the greater charged
offense will not be barred by the statute of limitations, but the lesser included
offense will be, is when the charged offense is murder and the lesser offense
is some lesser degree of homicide covered by the three-year statute of limita-
tion.' 45 If this situation should arise, it is suggested, as discussed above, that
the defendant at least have the option of waiving the statute of limitations
and receiving the lesser included offense instruction, provided, of course, that
all the other requirements for the instruction have been met.
Order in Which the Offenses Are Considered
Once the lesser included offense instruction has been given, the question
arises in what order, if any, the jury should consider the greater and lesser
offenses. Oklahoma follows the general trend in requiring the jury to first
137. Comment, Waiver of the Statute of Limitations in Criminal Prosecutions: United States
v. Wild, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1550, 1557 (1977).
138. Id. at 1557.
139. Note, Criminal Procedure-Recognizing the Jury's Province to Consider the Lesser Included
Offense: State v. Ogden, 58 OR. L. REV. 572, 577 (1980).
140. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
141. Blair, supra note 10, 472-75.
142. 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
143. 22 OKrLA. STAT. § 151 (1981), provides: "There is no limitation of the time within which
a prosecution for murder must be commenced. It may be commenced at any time after the death
of the person killed."
144. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (Supp. 1984).
145. Osborn v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 259, 194 P.2d 176 (1948).
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acquit the defendant of the greater offense before it considers the lesser in-
cluded offense.'4 6 As stated by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Love v.
State,'"I the jury should be instructed that "if after a fair and impartial con-
sideration of all evidence in the case they were not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt as charged . . . . then it would
be their duty to consider as to whether he was guilty of the next lower offense
embraced in the charge."'1
48
This instruction is in keeping with that in other states. California, for
example, requires that the jury be instructed that if it cannot agree on the
greater offense, it cannot return a verdict on the lesser offense. " 9 Likewise,
for double jeopardy purposes, a conviction of the lesser offense is treated
as an implicit acquittal of the greater offense.
Conclusion
The application of the lesser included offense doctrine has proven to be
somewhat difficult, primarily because of the existence of several different tests
for determining lesser included offenses. The confusion is compounded in a
jurisdiction, like Oklahoma, that uses more than one of the tests. Clearer
thinking concerning the doctrine can be fostered by simply choosing a specific
test and applying it consistently.
Double jeopardy and the due process concerns of notice and reliability of
the fact-finding process do combine, however, to require certain limitations.
In light of these limitations, the cognate-pleading test should be applied to
prosecution requests for a lesser included offense instruction, while the cognate-
evidence test should be applied to requests by the defendant. In determining
whether an instruction should actually be given, certain procedural aspects
of the doctrine, such as whether the instruction is warranted by the evidence,
the necessity of a request, the order of deliberation by the jury, and the time-
barred offense problem must be considered. An understanding of all of these
aspects of the lesser included offense doctrine will promote a clearer, more
efficient application of the doctrine.
146. The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal provides, in part, with respect to
lesser included offenses:
The defendant(s) [is] [are] charged with (list highest crime for which sufficient
evidence has been introduced). You are instructed that, in addition to the state's
having submitted evidence concerning the crime of (crime listed above), evidence
has also been introduced concerning the crime of (lesser included crime). If you
have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt on the charge of (highest crime
charged), you must then consider the charge of (lesser included crime).
147. 12 Okla. Crim. I, 150 P. 913, 916 (1915), cited with approval in Thoreson v. State,
69 Okla. Crim. 128, 135, 100 P.2d 896, 900 (1940).
148. Id.
149. Stone v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 519, 646 P.2d 809, 820,
183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 658 (1982).
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